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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
a prior employer to escape from contribution merely because a
claimant's wages increased after leaving the former employ.
But the dissenters4 7 strongly contended that:
1. The statute in its terms does4 not
compel apportionment of
8
the award among employers.
2. None of the decisions which have authorized pro rata division on the basis of contributory causation prevent a
claimant from recovering the entire award from the latest
employer if earlier employers, for any reason, are unable
to contribute.
3. Even if, as the majority concluded, § 15(6) was drafted
with reference to a single accident involving but one employer, the reasons for extending it to cover successive
accidents are compelling.
The dissent suggested that the purpose of the enactment of

§ 15(6) was to limit an employer's contingent liability, i. e., to
ensure that the employer may not be charged if the reduced earnings after the accident exceed the earnings before the injury occurred; therefore:
it is not less likely to have been the legislative intention to preclude such a consequence if in after years the
claimant, while working for somebody else in an era when
prevailing wage rates are disproportionate to those existing
when he was in the former employ, sustains an aggravation
49
of the previous condition while working for another.
While an award solely against the latest employer appears to
penalize him vis-a-vis prior employers whose earlier accidents are
found to have contributed to the present disability, it is arguable
that this apparent inequity is outweighed by the cogency of the
dissent in the instant case.
XIIL. OTHER CASES
Religious Associations
The Congregational Christian Churches of the United States
and the Evangelical and Reformed Church proposed to unite under
the name of the United Church of Christ. The General Council of
the former organization after a lengthy study, endorsed the union.
Over seventy per cent of its member churches, who voted on the
47. Van Voorhis, J., with Lewis, Ch. J., concurring.
§ 15 (5), (7).
49. Supra, note 45 at 306, 121 N. E. 2d at 237.
48. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
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proposal, approved. Plaintiff church opposed the union and
sought legal relief by means of a declaratory judgment' that General Council had no authority to consummate the union, and for
injunctive relief to restrain the union and to restrain General
Council from mingling its funds and assets with'those of another
denomination. Special Term granted the requested relief, but
the Appellate Division reversed on the law and facts, and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals, in CadmanMemorial
CongregationalSociety v. Kenyon,2 affirmed the dismissal.
No ecclesiastical question was presented, since both parties
admitted there was no power by which the General Council could
compel non-assenting churches to join the union or impose upon
them a change in doctrine. Neither funds and properties held
by the Cadman Church, nor funds held by the General Council
and its agencies under express trusts, e.g. pension funds, were
threatened.
The remaining issue involved the plaintiff's alleged beneficial
interest in general funds belonging to various boards and agencies
operating under the General Council. Plaintiff had contributed
substantial amounts to these latter groups on a voluntary basis.
The court restated the rule that such voluntary, unrestricted contributions for general religious purposes created no proprietory
or beneficial interest which the donor could enforce in a court of
law.' Moreover, a binding declaration of rights may be issued
only when all parties who are interested in, or who might be affected by the enforcement of such rights are made parties to the
suit.5 In the instant case none of the boards or agencies, many
incorporated in different jurisdictions, were joined.
Judge Froessel dissenting, agreed that the relief granted by
Special Term was far too broad. He would not, however, dismiss
the complaint, because he believed a declaratory judgment between
the two parties in the suit would clearly settle some legal rights,
namely the right to prevent the funds contributed by the plaintiffs
1. C. P. A. §473.
2. 306 N. Y. 151, 116 N. E. 2d 481 (1954).
3. See Watson v. Jones, 13- Wall. 679 (U. S. 1871); Trustees of Presbytery of
New York v. Westminister PresbyterianChurch of West Twenty Third Street, 222 N. Y.
305, 118 N. E. 800 (1918).
4. Comnparc Williains v. Williams, 8 N. Y. 525 (1853), and Bird v. Merklee, 144
N. Y. 544, 39 N. E. 645, (1895), with St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett, 281 N. Y. 115, 22
N. E. 2d 305 (1939).
5. C. P. A. § 193.; Manhattan Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Movers & Warehousernen's Ass'n of GreaterNew York, 289 N. Y. 82, 43 N. E. 2d 820 (1942) ; 1 ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, § 130 (2d ed. 1951).
6. The court declined to accept the assertion of plaintiff that these agencies had
no separate status because their boards of trustees, officers and administrators were controlled and supervised by the General Council.
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to the General Council and its agencies from being expended for
functions not authorized by their respective charters and constitutions as they existed at the date of the court's decree.
It is highly gratifying to observe that the three courts who
dealt with this case realized the effect their judgment would have,
not only upon the parties to the suit, but also to the entire structure of a distinguished Protestant sect. The facts of the controversy were reviewed extensively in an attempt to do justice to all
the conflicting interests.
Court of Claims Act
In Cimo v. State,7 claimant asked leave to file a claim for
damage to her real property, occasioned by a change of grade in
front of said property, in connection with a grade crossing elimination structure instituted by the defendant. She conceded that
the claim was not filed within the six month period specified in
the Grade Crossing Elimination Act which gave rise to her cause
of action," but claimed that the more general provisions of the
Court of Claims Act 9 enabled her to take advantage of the discretionary two year statute of limitations contained therein.10 The
Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Divisi6n's reversal of
the Court of Claims, held (6-1), that the claim was barred by the
six month statute of limitations in the specific statute giving rise
to her cause of action.1
The court pointed out that the claimant could advance only
two arguments in her favor. The first would necessitate the finding
that claims such as hers were governed by two statutes of limitation: one of six months and another of two years. It is obvious
that the Legislature could not intend such duality.
The second form of reasoning is that the time limitations in
the earlier, specific statute were repealed, by implication, by the
general provisions of the Court of Claims Act. Repeal by imtlication is not favored and will be decreed only where a clear intent
appears to effect that purpose. 2 The court pointed out unless
7. 306 N. Y. 143, 116 N. E. 2d 290 (1954).
8. L 1928, Chap. 678. McK. UNCONSOL. LAws § 7906.
9. CoURr OF CLAims AcT § 10 (4), (5).
10. Id. § 10 (5).
11. At Common law no such damages were recoverable. Conklin v. New York,
0. & HW.R. Co., 102 N. Y. 109, 6 N. E. 663 (1886). Heiser v. Mayor etc. of New York,
104 N. Y; 68. 9 N. E. 866 (1887).
12. City of New York v. Maltbie, 274 N. Y. 90, 97, 8 N. E. 2d 289, 292 (1937);
Mority v. United Brethrens Church, 269 N. Y. 125, 133, 199 N. E. 29, 31 (1935).

